Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial decisionmaking since the 1980s-as a way of creating "presidential legislative history" to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive empirical examination of how courts have received presidential legislative history to date. Three main findings emerge from this analysis. First, contrary to the pervasive (and legitimate) fears in the literature on signing statements, courts rarely cite signing statements in their decisions. Second, in the aggregate, when courts cite signing statements, they cite them in predictably partisan ways, with judges citing Presidents' signing statements from their own political parties more often than those of the opposing parties. This effect, however, is driven entirely by the behavior of Republican-appointed appellate jurists. Third, courts predominately employ signing statements to buttress aligned statutory text and conventional sources of legislative history, and seemingly never rely on them to override contrary plain statutory text or even unified traditional legislative history. This suggests that signing statements have low rank among interpretative tools and courts primarily use them to complement rather than substitute for congressional legislative history. In this sense, Presidents have largely failed to establish an alternative corpus of valid interpretive material.
INTRODUCTION
Even as executive power creeps into nearly every domain of government affairs, 1 one might think that legislative authority is at least unmolested in the area stamped with that branch's name-legislative history. But this would be wrong. For the last one hundred and fifty years, Presidents have been issuing statements when they sign laws. 2 These presidential signing statements have varied uses, 3 but in recent decades one important objective of the statements is to influence how courts interpret the statute in question. They seek, in other words, to presidentialize legislative history. 4 For most of this country's history, signing statements were used sparingly, mainly for rhetorical purposes, praising legislation or recognizing individuals or organizations for their effort in the passage of a bill. 5 For example, President Kennedy signed a bill on October 16, 1962 that removed the requirement that National Science Foundation (NSF) beneficiaries sign an anti-Communist oath. 6 Celebrating the bill, Kennedy said in a signing statement attached to the bill, "It is highly unlikely that the affidavit requirement kept any Communist out of the programs. It did, however, keep out those who considered the disclaimer affidavit a bridle upon freedom of thought. I am glad to approve the legislation." 7 Though it is possible to find such statements recently, at least since the Carter and, particularly, the Reagan Administrations, some signing statements have taken on a new and more assertive character. 8 The question of why Presidents issue signing statements is much debated: 9 perhaps they represent a vehicle of public communication; 10 or perhaps they represent a way of communicating to agencies; 11 or perhaps to Congress. 12 Among the rationales for signing statements, 13 however, one has received more attention than others-that, at least recently, a presidential signing statement enters as part of the legislative history of the act, and thereby influences how courts subsequently construe the statute itself. 14 By common account, this was and 1996, the courts cited signing statements forty-two times).
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of legislative history to "looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends." 19 In their study of judges' use of legislative history, Professors Abramowicz and Tiller, for instance, find general support for Leventhal's suggestion. 20 Similarly, here we expect judges to use the statements in an effort to justify their legal decisions when the record is sparse; or if the record is thick, presidential signing statements provide yet an additional layer of support to buttress a judge's decision to rule in a particular way. 21 Thus, in creating further legislative history, the signing statements may represent an important way for Presidents to enhance the probability that their preferred policies and interpretations are carried out by the lifetime tenured judges long after the President leaves office. 22 The findings from our empirical analysis support three main conclusions. 23 The first finding is that the overall rate of citations to signing statements by appellate judges is extremely low. In the Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts, there is only one citation to a signing statement per 7,500 non-criminal cases. 24 This suggests that Attorney General Meese and the Reagan Administration largely failed in their objective of presidentializing legislative history.
To the extent judges cite to legislative history in their opinions, they do so primarily to sources Our focus is on "substantive" signing statements that purport to interpret a statute, either on its own terms, or in light of the President's view of constitutional principles; we exclude rhetorical or celebratory statements from our analysis. Notice that this approach conflates to some extent the conventional "statutory" and "constitutional" designations made in the literature. 48 For our part, the critical feature of the statement is that it construes the meaning of the statute. This approach equally captures interpretations of statutes motivated by a stated desire to avoid a perceived constitutional infirmity, as well as interpretations motivated by nonconstitutional considerations. In Figure 1 , 49 we present the data on substantive presidential signing statements attached to Public Laws since 1950. As can be seen, it was in the Reagan Administration that there began an explosion in the number of signing statements. Indeed, since the 1980s, Presidents have issued over 1,000 signing statements, 50 and they appear particularly assertive about constitutional and interpretive issues later in their terms. 51 Moreover, these trends hold whether there are Democrats or Republicans in office. Focusing on the proportion of public laws with signing statements, on the x-axis, foreign aid and defense appear among the top ten topics, both plausibly traditional areas of executive control.
However, also appearing in the top ten topics are the environment, civil rights, housing, and welfare, all contentious domestic areas where congressional views take on substantial weight.
Overall, both foreign and domestic areas populate the topics most proportionately frequented by signing statements.
Figure 2: Topics of Signing Statements
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These figures corroborate the notion that the effort to presidentialize legislative history has been underway since at least the 1980s. Since that time, there has been an explosion in the number of signing statements issued by Presidents, only recently dipping, and these signing statements span a variety of issue-areas, including controversial areas of domestic policy, such as civil rights and the environment.
B. The Literature: A (Mostly) Dim View
For the most part, the literature adopts a dim view of signing statements. The concerns fall, roughly, into two categories. First, some scholars raise legal concerns largely involving separation of powers issues. 54 Second, more recently, Stiglitz (with co-authors) raised institutional concerns with signing statements from the perspective of positive political theory. 55 We address these strands of the literature in turn.
The dominant view in the legal literature is that signing statements raise serious separation of powers concerns. 56 The fear that many have is that the President, in issuing a 56. See generally Rodriguez et al., supra note 15 (using positive political theory to demonstrate the negative effects of signing statements, if credited by courts); Cooper, supra note 54, at 531 (arguing that signing statements "can and have been used as line-item vetoes of legislation presented to the president for signature or veto but without the use of the formal veto or the opportunity for legislative override processes."); ABA, supra note 54, at 5 (resolving that the ABA "oppose[s], as contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of signing statement, is in effect issuing a line item veto, an institutional device that the Court invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York. 57 For example, when the President construes a clause in a statute to be unconstitutional and sidelines the provision in a signing statement, has he thereby "vetoed" an item in the statute? And in doing so, does the President violate the separation of powers, trenching on legislative powers? Such questions as these animate large portions of the unsettled legal literature on signing statements and raise serious concerns about the role of these statements. 58 Notice, however, that for the statements to raise these concerns, they have to be taken seriously by other institutions-agencies and, ultimately, courts, in a way that is different than the way these institutions would treat other forms of presidential communication, such as an executive order, or an ordinary memo. As Professors Bradley and Posner aptly observe, 59 the President may express his view about a statute through these other means without exciting controversy. However, controversy attaches specifically to signing statements because-some fear-they, in effect, "amend" the language of the statute, changing its meaning in a way that these other presidential expressions cannot. For this to happen, however, courts must credit signing statements with the authority to do so. Otherwise, even if an agency takes the signing statement as firm instructions not to enforce some provision of the statute, the agency action at powers, the issuance of presidential signing statements that claim the authority or intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law the president has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress").
57 A related concern in the literature is more institutional in nature. The concern articulated in recent research is that signing statements upset the equilibrium between the executive and the legislature, and that, if credited by courts, signing statements will induce the legislature to respond in problematic ways. 61 In particular, one concern is that if the President can, in effect, "amend" a bill after it leaves Congress, Congress will be less likely to reach agreements during the legislative process, because agreements made will be overturned or changed after final votes have been tallied. 62 This will exacerbate gridlock in that branch of government. 63 Congress may also retaliate along other problematic margins, for instance holding up confirmation on nominees as a form of hostage taking, or threatening to not extend the debt ceiling. 64 For these institutional reasons, too, one might not want to see courts give credit to presidential signing statements-at least not more credit than they would give to a presidential speech or other less formal mode of communication. This concern in the literature, too, motivates our empirical inquiry to understand how courts view these signing statements. 
II. THE JUDICIARY AND SIGNING STATEMENTS
A. Empirical Predictions
We now turn to an empirical analysis of signing statements. The first part of this section contains a statistical analysis of signing statement citations of appellate and Supreme Court opinions. The second part of the analysis encompasses a careful read and qualitative analysis of the content of "major" citations to signing statements. 65 Underlying both of these analysis are the predictions of the legal literature as to how signing statements will be used by the judiciary. President, if successful, has "embedded" his view into the statute. Hence, it would be reasonable to expect that judges should cite presidential signing statements not only during the President's term in office, but long after the President has left power.
Third, if Presidents use signing statements to bolster their ideological agenda, and judges use signing statements as presidential legislative history, then one would expect judges to cite the presidential signing statements in ways consistent with Judge Leventhal's famous quip. 67 The fact that judges are ideological in decisionmaking has now been widely demonstrated in countless empirical studies. 68 Most work examines judicial votes or decisions as evidence of this tendency, but other papers discuss the particular tools that judges employ to make their decision more ideologically aligned with their preferences. 69 Presidential legislative history, one would expect, would fit into this larger pattern of partisan and ideological judging.
If so, we should see judges acting ideologically with respect to how they cite signing statements, much as they do with respect to conventional legislative history. That is, judges should be more likely to cite statements of Presidents who are of the same political affiliation as the judge. Thus, Democratic judges should cite Democratic presidential signing statements and Republican judges should cite Republican presidential signing statements. We now examine how the empirical evidence lines up with these predictions.
B. Data and Frequency in Citations
To explore how the judiciary handles presidential signing statements, we developed a novel dataset consisting of the universe of published and unpublished decisions that had citations to presidential signing statements by federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court between 1976 and 2011. The dataset therefore focuses on the courts most likely to be influential in interpreting legislation, the appellate courts. 70 Collecting these data was challenging because judges do not cite presidential signing statements in a uniform way. 71 As reflected in the appendix, we developed a search algorithm through substantial trial and error and consultation with a range of legal research librarians; using Westlaw and this search algorithm, we found ninety-six appellate and Supreme Court opinions during this thirty-six-year period that contained citations to presidential signing statements. 72 We believe this to be the most comprehensive search for appellate citations to presidential signing statements to date. The data is informative Meese's objectives of presidentializing legislative history, the data of this Article shows signing statements to be an almost complete failure. It only modestly exaggerates to say that courts simply do not cite presidential signing statements.
C. Timing of Citations
Despite the infrequency of citations to signing statements in judicial opinions, there are a sufficient number of citations over the thirty-six-year period to conduct a statistical analysis of court behavior with respect to signing statements. Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution of signing statement citations by number of years elapsed between the year of the signing statement and the year of judicial citation to that signing statement. An examination of the data of these ninety-six citations shows that the average elapsed time between signing statement issuance and judicial opinion is ten years, two months, with the median time being six years. Some citing judicial opinions follow long after the President leaves office, such as the Pledge of Allegiance cases, which came roughly half a century after the signing statements at issue. 78 (1943) . Even if we trim the sample to opinions in which more than forty years have elapsed between statement and citation, the average elapsed time between statement and citation is seven years nine months with a median elapsed time of six years. second finding cuts modestly against the first finding, in that it suggests that the influence Presidents exert through signing statements may meaningfully "embed" into the statute, touching the decisions of a future judiciary whose outcomes he cannot influence directly through briefs and oral argument in the courtroom. In this way, presidential signing statements seem to affect the enduring meaning of the statute, if credited by courts. 
D. Role of Ideology in Citations to Presidential Signing Statements
Now consider how the political leanings (or ideology) of judges might influence citations to signing statements. As noted earlier, the question is whether, conditional on citing signing 23 statements, judges act in ways that are predicted by the literature on judicial decisionmakingciting statements from Presidents of their own party more frequently than Presidents of opposing parties. 79 We begin by measuring two variables. The first variable, "President Party," is the political party of the President who signed the statement. The second variable, "Judge Party," is the political party of the President who appointed the authoring judge who cited the signing statement. Table 1 presents a cross tabulation for all citations to signing statement by the party of the signing President and the party of the citing judge. Table 2 is Own Citation. Own Citation is equal to 1 if a judge is citing a presidential signing statement by the President of his/her own party, and equal to 0 otherwise. The second dependent variable used in Model 2 in Table 2 is an indicator for whether the reference to the presidential signing statement is considered to be a "major" citation in the opinion, taking a 1 if so, and 0 if the reference is fleeting. Under the coding scheme we employ, a citation would be characterized as major if it is in the body of the opinion, as opposed to a footnote, is cited alone rather than as part of a string citation, or is a citation that is used to support what seems to be a critical point in the argument of the opinion. By comparison, citations that appear in footnotes, or in a string of citations, or in which the judge uses the citation to support a minor point in the argument classify as a minor citation. 81 A number of independent variables are used in the regression analysis. Republican Judge is the party of the judge as described above, and is equal to 1 if Republican and 0 if Democratic. 82 We use a linear probability model to 81 . Most of these characteristics are objective coding characteristics of the citation. Nevertheless, to avoid researcher bias, the research librarians and research assistants coded this variable.
Republican Signing President
82. See supra Part III.C. Not reported in the table-but available on request-we also include a time trend and estimate the relevant relationships. 83 Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis. As discussed below, Models 1-3 present the results for the effect of the independent variables on Own Citations, and Models 4-6 present the results for the effect of the independent variables on whether the citation is a Major
Reference. Both models have ninety-two observations, omitting the four per curiam decisions.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.
Despite there being only ninety-two observations we obtain meaningful results. Consider first Model 1. There, we see that the coefficient on Republican Judge is positive and statistically significant at the 99% level. This means that Republican judges are more likely to cite
Republican presidential signing statements than Democratic judges are to cite Democratic presidential signing statements. Indeed, the coefficient indicates that Republican judges are thirty percentage points more likely to cite Republican signing statements than Democratic judges are to cite Democratic signing statements. This is both statistically significant and substantively very large, especially given this sample's small size. This is one of the main statistical findings of this Article and lends credibility to the notion that Republican-appointed judges are particularly prone to seek out "friends" when citing signing statements.
Model 1 also shows that as more time elapses between the signing statement and the the square of the time trend in some of the specifications; the table identifies the specifications with this feature. 83. We have also analyzed the data using a random effects probit model using random effects for judges or random effects for circuits. David K. Guilkey & James L. Murphy, Estimation and Testing in the Random Effects Probit Model, 59 J. ECONOMETRICS 301 (1993). The results from analyzing that model do not differ qualitatively from those reported for the linear probability model in this body of the Article; we will make those results available on request. We opt for the simpler linear probability model due to its transparency and ease of interpretation.
judicial opinion that cites the statement, judges are less likely to cite their own party's statement and are more likely to cross party lines in citations. These latter results are consistent with the idea that presidential-judicial politics has become more partisan with the passage of time. It is also consistent with the argument that there is ideological drift of political parties over time.
In Models 2 and 3, we add time trends (Model 2) and circuit fixed effects (Model 3). The time trends should capture any (quadratic) trend in the tendency of judges to cite signing statements of their own parties over time-for example, if citation culture changes over time.
The circuit fixed effects absorb any time-invariant feature of the circuits with respect to citation practices-for instance, it may be that some circuits have an idiosyncratic culture of citing Republican signing statements, quite apart from the fact that Republican judges also sit on the circuit. The fixed effects allow us to examine how citation behavior varies within circuits.
These two sets of additional checks, however, do little to change the core substantive results. In Model 3, which is the most demanding specification and features both time trends and circuit fixed effects, the magnitude of the coefficient on Republican Judge attenuates somewhat, but remains large and statistically significant, implying that Republican judges are about twentythree percentage points more likely to cite statements of their own party than Democratic judges. 84 84. That is, the coefficient is 0.229; this suggests an effect of the magnitude noted in the text. In this specification, the coefficient on Time Elapsed to Decision also attenuates to the point that it is no longer statistically significant.
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Table 2: The Effect of Political Ideology on Judicial Citations to Signing Statements
Note: ' 90 percent level statistical significance; ** 99 percent level statistical significance. Own Citation is the dependent variable in models 1-3 and takes a 1 if the judge is citing a presidential signing statement by the President of his or her own party and a 0 otherwise. Major Reference is the dependent variable in models 4-6 and takes a 1 if the reference to the signing statement is considered "major" and 0 otherwise. Now consider Model 4, which focuses on the ability to predict "major" references to signing statements in judicial opinions. No coefficient in the regression is statistically significant at the 90% level or above, meaning that the independent variables we examine do a poor job at predicting major versus minor citations to signing statements. Adding time trends and circuit 29 fixed effects does not change this pattern.
In summary, Table 2 shows that there is a partisan divide in judicial behavior on the citation of presidential signing statements, with Republicans judges citing own party statements with much higher frequency than Democrats. In addition, coefficients on control variables suggest that judges are more willing to cross party lines to cite opposing party signing statements as time elapses between signing statements and opinions. Finally, there seem to be few, if any, predictors of the type of citation, major or minor, judges will employ.
Combining the findings from this statistical exercise, we see a regular pattern in the data.
Courts rarely cite signing statements. When courts do cite them, it is usually after the signing President has left office. We also find evidence that Republican judges tend to favor signing statements issued by Presidents of their own party. This conforms to searching for one's friends, and to the more general findings in the literature on the strategic use of citations. But we do not find the symmetrical finding for Democratic judges-they seem to cite signing statements issued by Presidents of both parties about equally.
E. Major Statutory and Constitutional Citations to Signing Statements
The quantitative analysis in the previous section provided essential insight into the statistical regularities of when judges cite signing statements. To supplement this quantitative analysis, we also carefully read the cases involving major citations to signing statements to examine how courts use them. This investigation generates several conclusions. The most 30 general conclusion is that, even when courts cite signing statements, they do not use them to override clear statutory text or even more conventional sources of legislative history, such as committee reports. Contrary to the greatest fears of some legal scholars, courts do not appear to use signing statements as an effective line item veto. 85 Still, courts do seem to credit signing statements in some contexts and to definitely reject them in others, as discussed below.
Perhaps most commonly, courts appear to use signing statements to buttress their interpretation of a statute when the text itself is not entirely plain and the other conventional sources of legislative history are not contrary to the statement. In this regard, United States v.
Fisher is characteristic. 86 There, the issue was whether Congress had designated the Florida Keys as a marine sanctuary in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection Act, thereby displacing the full set of more general procedures for such designations set forth in the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (Sanctuaries Act). 87 The court concluded that Congress had done so, in part relying on statutory text, which provided that the Keys "should be treated as if it 'had been designated' under the Sanctuaries Act," and in part based on President H.W. Bush's signing statement, which remarked that Congress had "bypassed" the procedures of the Sanctuary Act. 88 In this case, as in perhaps the modal signing statement case, there is no evident conflict between the statement and statutory text or other sources of legislative history. "substantially justified," the prevailing party would not be entitled to such fees and costs. 113 A question the court confronted was whether an agency action that was set aside as arbitrary and capricious-or as failing the substantial evidence test-under the Administrative Procedure Act could nonetheless be substantially justified, thereby barring fees and costs to the prevailing party. 114 The court noted legislative materials from the House, which suggested that an agency action set aside as arbitrary and capricious was "virtually certain" to not be substantially justified, but backed off from any "per se" equivalence of the two standards of review. 115 Critically, however, the court also pointedly rejected a sharp distinction between the standards, 
CONCLUSION
The headline story of (at least) the last four decades of constitutional and administrative law is one of the seemingly unstoppable growth of executive authority. Here, we have examined one of the few areas where the executive has tried and largely failed to exert authority: legislative history. 120 Despite the explicit efforts of the Reagan Administration and Edwin Meese, signing statements have not entered the canon of legislative history and statutory construction. 121 120. The Executive has lost along other margins, too, though these losses work against the main current. For example, the failure of the executive to win the battle over the Independent Counsel, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), represents another rare loss for the branch of government.
121. Bradley & Posner, supra note 13, at 316.
The question of why this project failed is of great interest, and we can only speculate.
One view is that the conservative assault on statutory interpretation proceeded along two tracks.
The first, the one we examine here, was to change how courts view legislative history. This track largely failed. The second was even more ambitious: to shift interpretive methodology entirely away from legislative history to more favorable ground-that is, to focus judicial attention on statutory text rather than purposes and legislative history. This second track has to a large extent succeeded. Courts now generally appear less willing to credit legislative history, whatever the source. 122 That said, in those rare instances where courts do engage with signing statements, Meese appears more successful. Judges otherwise sympathetic with the President use signing statements to bolster their arguments, even long after the signing President has left office. To us, this suggests that signing statements have potential force in our judicial system-judges at times seem drawn to sympathetic interpretative material. Should courts begin to pursue legislative purposes and use legislative history more freely, signing statements may again become a highly contested battleground. 123 This pattern stresses the normative issue of whether courts should use signing statements.
Though not our focus here, other work has argued that-given separation of powers dynamics of the legislative and executive branches of government-courts should not rely upon signing statements for legislative history. 124 If the President is able to presidentialize legislative history, our country will likely suffer even greater breakdown in the machinery of democratic self- A comprehensive set of court opinions in which the author cites to a presidential signing statement is a difficult task, and we cannot ensure that our dataset does not omit relevant opinions. It is possible that our searches omit citations that follow a non-standard format or otherwise contain errors in formatting. Notwithstanding this limitation, we are reasonably certain there is no standard citation method for signing statements we have missed. We also believe that there is not a systematic bias in any missing cases.
The list of the cases with opinions citing signing statements is below.
